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Abstract
In this study of five developed markets we analyse the sizes of portfolios required for achieving
most diversification benefits. Using daily data, we trace the year-to-year dynamic of these
sizes between 1975 and 2011. We compute several widely-accepted measures of risk and use
an extreme risk measure to account for black swan events. In addition to providing portfolio
size recommendations for an average investor, we estimate confidence bands around central
measures of risk and offer recommendations for attaining most diversification benefits 90
percent of the time instead of on average. We find that investors concerned with extreme
risk can achieve diversification benefits with a relatively small number of stocks.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we present new answers to a decades old question1 about the number of
stocks2 required to reduce the level of diversifiable risk in equity portfolios. Using daily
data3 for five developed financial markets (the US, the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia)4,
we trace the year-to-year dynamic of required portfolio sizes between 1975 and 2011. We
calculate several widely-accepted measures of risk: standard deviation, expected shortfall
at 1%, and terminal wealth standard deviation. This is the first empirical study to use an
extreme risk measure to account for black swan events related to the recent Global Financial
Crisis, as well as the more common asymmetries in returns during bull and bear markets. To
the best of our knowledge, the extant literature only provides portfolio size recommendations
for an average investor. Thus, in addition to providing portfolio size recommendations for
an average investor, we estimate confidence bands around two central measures of risk to
provide portfolio size recommendations for attaining most diversification benefits 90 percent
of the time instead of on average. Differences in market conditions across periods, in different
countries, and with different risk measures make a comparative analysis of the benefits of
diversification fraught with difficulties. Consequently, we define a diversification measure
that is exclusively focused on diversifiable risk and is bounded between 0 and 1. We find
1The question of the optimal number of stocks in a diversified portfolio has been extensively studied in the
literature, especially for the US. Using a variety of risk measures, authors have not yet reached a definitive
conclusion. The pioneering paper by Evans and Archer (1968) was the first study to evaluate the reduction
in portfolio risk as portfolio size increased. With standard deviation as a risk measure, they show that on
average eight to ten stocks are sufficient to achieve most of the benefits of diversification. Standard deviation
was commonly used as a measure of risk in earlier studies (see for example Fisher and Lorie, 1970; Wagner
and Lau, 1971; Solnik, 1974; Bloomfield et al., 1977; Bird and Tippett, 1986; Statman, 1987) and continued
to be a popular choice in the past decade (e.g., Brands and Gallagher, 2005; Benjelloun, 2010). Several other
measures include variance (Johnson and Shannon, 1974; Elton and Gruber, 1977; Beck et al., 1996), mean
absolute deviation (Fisher and Lorie, 1970; Fielitz, 1974), and terminal wealth standard deviation (O’Neal,
1997; Brands and Gallagher, 2005; Benjelloun, 2010). Within the linear market model framework, measures
of portfolio beta, R2, residual variance have been used in assessing level of diversification (see for example
Wagner and Lau, 1971; Klemkosky and Martin, 1975). Correlation between returns on a portfolio and the
market index was also used in Beck et al. (1996); Dbouk and Kryzanowski (2009); Kryzanowski and Singh
(2010). In addition to the measures mentioned above, Fisher and Lorie (1970)’s study was the only one that
used Gini’s mean difference and coefficient of concentration as measures of portfolio diversification. Several
examples of downside measures of risk have also been found in the literature: semi-variance (O’Neal, 1997;
Kryzanowski and Singh, 2010) and mean shortfall (O’Neal, 1997). Although Hyung and de Vries (2005) and
Ibragimov and Walden (2007) provide some theoretical justification for the use of extremely heavy-tailed
risks in measuring portfolio diversification, the empirical analyses are only starting to emerge (e.g., Hyung
and de Vries, 2012).
2Hereafter, referred to as portfolio size.
3Most papers use lower frequencies varying from weekly (Solnik, 1974); monthly (Klemkosky and Martin,
1975; Beck et al., 1996; Benjelloun, 2010; Kryzanowski and Singh, 2010); quarterly (Johnson and Shannon,
1974; O’Neal, 1997); semi-annual (Evans and Archer, 1968) to annual data (Fisher and Lorie, 1970; Jennings,
1971).
4Most of the studies on diversification and portfolio size focus on the US markets and relatively few study
other markets. The exceptions are Solnik (1974) who, analyses the US and markets in the UK, Germany,
France, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands; Bird and Tippett (1986) and Brands and Gallagher
(2005) report on Australia; Copp and Cleary (1999) and Kryzanowski and Singh (2010) study Canada; Byrne
and Lee (2000) study the UK.
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that the correlation structures in the five markets change during periods of financial market
distress. We also find that these changes differ in periods of market-wide crises and industry-
specific meltdowns, that have important implications for recommended portfolio sizes.
Although it is commonly recommended that risk-averse investors hold a number of un-
correlated securities in their portfolios to achieve some degree of diversification, it is not
readily obvious how many stocks are required to avoid most diversifiable risk. Holding too
few stocks exposes the investor to unnecessary idiosyncratic risk. Holding too many stocks
is costly both in terms of the cost of numerous transactions needed to build the initial port-
folio and the opportunity cost of monitoring a large diversified portfolio. The larger the
number of stocks in a portfolio, the higher the chances of underperforming the benchmark
after fees. If it is possible to eliminate most diversifiable risk with a small portfolio, the need
for the large portfolios typically held by equity funds is unjustified. Campbell et al. (2001),
however, have shown that firm specific risk in the U.S. has grown over the past thirty years
relative to the overall volatility of the stock market and that correlations between stocks
have correspondingly decreased, reinforcing the advisability of larger portfolios.
We use a simulation approach to construct random portfolios5 based on actual daily equity
returns over the period 1975 to 2011. We construct equally weighted random portfolios of
different sizes ranging from portfolios consisting of only one security to a broad market
portfolio including all actively traded securities in the market. For each of these portfolios,
we analyse several measures of risk both within a sub-period and across different stock
markets. We focus on estimates of time series standard deviation (SD), expected shortfall
(ES) and terminal wealth standard deviation (TWSD) for portfolios of different sizes.6 We
use SD as a benchmark to be able to compare our results to the previous literature. The ES
provides a coherent downside risk measure essential for accounting for black swan events.
The TWSD measure is a standard benchmark for buy-and-hold no-rebalancing portfolios.
We compare five developed equity markets and trace the dynamics of diversification benefits
over the past 37 years in these markets. Note, that we do not attempt to build international
portfolios or assess the benefits of international diversification. Put another way, we analyse
each of the five markets separately from the perspective of domestic investors. Pooling the
five markets together, would contaminate our results with exchange rate risk.
We find that investors concerned with tail risk can achieve diversification benefits with
a relatively small number of stocks. For the same level of risk reduction, our results for risk
measures that do not consider extreme losses7 find no substantial differences in portfolio sizes
5Using individual investor data from a large US discount brokerage house, Goetzmann and Kumar (2008)
show that, on average, portfolios constructed from randomly selected stocks exhibit lower risk than those
of actual investors. The discrepancy is consistent with over-confidence, trend-following behavior, and local
bias. Thus, a strategy of randomly selecting stocks eliminates behavioural biases and concentrates solely on
the effects of portfolio sizes on their riskiness.
6In addition to the risk measures outlined above, we have also estimated other common measures of
risk, performance and diversification. We considered lower partial moments (LPMs), Value-at-Risk (VaR),
mean absolute deviation (MAD) and median absolute deviation for risk; arithmetic and geometric returns,
Sharpe and Treynor measures for performance; R2 and correlation coefficients with the market portfolio for
diversification. Due to article length restrictions, we provide these additional results on our website (URL
site is omitted for double blind review).
7See the measures mentioned in footnote 6.
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when compared to results using standard deviation as a risk measure. Previous literature
provides answers to the question of portfolio size only for an average investor. To improve on
these results we construct 90% confidence bands around our calculated central risk measures
that give us an upper limit to the number of stocks required in a portfolio that assures
investors of the desired level of diversification 90% of the time instead of on average.
We find that portfolios aimed at diversifying extreme losses measured by ES1% are, on
average, smaller in size (US: 16; UK: 16; Japan: 13; Canada: 19; Australia: 18 stocks),
compared to when SD is used as a risk measure (US: 23; UK: 21; Japan: 19; Canada: 25;
Australia: 24 stocks). To achieve the same level of risk reduction but with 90% confidence,
instead of on average, we find that portfolios aimed at diversifying extreme losses (e.g., ES1%)
are typically larger (US: 52; UK: 44; Japan: 50; Canada: 41; Australia: 38 stocks) than when
we use SD as our risk metric (US: 49; UK: 43; Japan: 39; Canada: 40; Australia: 38 stocks).
In sum, as we will show, the portfolio sizes needed to diversify idiosyncratic risk away with a
given level of confidence depend on: (i) the measure of risk; (ii) the required confidence level
needed to achieve a 90% reduction in diversifiable risk; (iii) market locale; (iv) the changing
correlation structure between stock returns during periods of financial distress; and (v) the
differences in correlation structures in periods of market-wide crises and industry-specific
meltdowns.
Portfolio sizes recommended in this paper are in sharp contrast with mutual fund industry
norms as well as the portfolio holdings of individual investors. For example, the number of
stocks held by an average, all-domestic US equity fund is 77 stocks.8 These large portfolios
are supported by some academic studies suggesting that the number of stocks in a portfolio
should be in excess of 50 (Copp and Cleary, 1999; Domian et al., 2007; Benjelloun, 2010;
Kryzanowski and Singh, 2010). However, the average fund underperforms the market index,
frequently needs rebalancing and thus is expensive to manage. In contrast, other studies
indicate that substantial diversification benefits can be achieved by owning as few as 6-15
stocks (Evans and Archer, 1968; Jennings, 1971; Fielitz, 1974; Johnson and Shannon, 1974;
Solnik, 1974; Bird and Tippett, 1986; Tang, 2004; Brands and Gallagher, 2005). In fact,
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008, p.437) find in the Survey of Consumer Finances of 62,387 US
households that the average American investor owns 4 stocks (with a median of 3). Ivkovic
et al. (2008, p.619, Table 1) discover similar results of 4 to 11 stocks depending on the wealth
of investors.
Many of the conclusions in the studies cited in footnote 1 are based on either the mean
or the median measure of risk among a large number of randomly selected n-stock portfolios.
However, as noted in Tang (2004, pp.155-156) these “...findings are based on the expected
portfolio variances (or risk) for different portfolio sizes, which are different from the actual
portfolio risk. There is no guarantee that the risk of one particular portfolio is the same as
the expected risk with the same portfolio size (i.e., risk of the portfolio risk exists). Hence,
there are additional sample risks in that your portfolio may not be the same as the population
average.” Evans and Archer (1968) were the first to calculate the 95% confidence limit to
8On July 3, 2013, the interquartile range for the number of holdings of 2,088 all domestic US equity
mutual funds registered in the Morningstar database when index funds are excluded is 49 to 129 stocks.
Source: Morningstar Fund Screener.
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Figure 1: Number of common stocks by country. The lines represent the number of stocks used in our
analysis after removing stocks that have traded less than 25% of the trading days in a particular year. For
example, in 2011, the total number of stocks across the five markets used in the analysis is 10,964 (down
from 11,456 for which data were available).
their central measure but did not infer the portfolio size recommendations based on this
result (Evans and Archer, 1968, Figure 1, p.765). In fact, in the past 45 years (since Evans
and Archer, 1968) no research has been done to investigate the relationship of portfolio size
and confidence levels that assures, at a specific certainty level, a reduction in risk.
In Section 2, we discuss our data and methodology. In Section 3, we present our results.
We draw our conclusions in Section 4.
2. Data and Methodology
We assume that (i) each portfolio contains only common stocks; (ii) purchases are fi-
nanced without borrowing; (iii) investors’ actions will not influence the price and/or dividend
of an individual stock; (iv) taxes are not considered. These assumptions are similar to those
in Jennings (1971). We analyse each of the five markets separately to avoid contaminating
our results with exchange rate fluctuations. Our data are obtained from Thomson Reuters
Datastream and consist of daily total return observations on common stocks listed on the
NYSE-AMEX, the Nasdaq, the London, Tokyo, Toronto and Australian stock exchanges
between 1975 to 2011. Figure 1 depicts the total number of stocks for each country. To
avoid survivorship bias we acquire total return indices for both active and delisted securi-
ties. For each of these years, we consider only securities which have traded at least 75% of
the trading days in a particular year.9 We do not analyse continental European financial
9We acknowledge that there may be a small look-ahead bias due to the fact that we eliminate stocks that
were delisted during a year. Our data filters do not distinguish between the following subsets of stocks: i)
stocks that are listed on the exchange during a particular year but excluded because they are thinly traded
(less than 25% of trading days in a year); ii) stocks that were active but were delisted early in the year (e.g.,
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markets since our sampling period includes these countries’ transition to a single currency
and the subsequent increase in cross-listings of national enterprises in exchanges across the
Eurozone.
Portfolio total risk is modeled as a combination of systematic risk and specific or unsys-
tematic risk. As the number of securities included in a portfolio approaches the number of
securities in the market, portfolio risk approaches the overall level of systematic risk, that is,
market risk, suggesting a relationship that behaves as a decreasing asymptotic function. Re-
duction in portfolio risk can then be achieved up to the point where all unsystematic risk has
been eliminated or where the incremental decrease in unsystematic risk brings insignificant
benefits.10
We construct portfolios by randomly drawing n stocks without replacement from the
entire sample for a particular stock market. These are equally weighted to give a portfolio
return Rni , where n = 1..N indicates the number of stocks in the portfolio and N is the total
number of actively traded stocks in the subperiod analysed, and i = 1..M represents the
draw number. Given that our sample includes non-surviving stocks, a stock in the chosen
portfolio that does not survive in one period, is replaced in the subsequent period with a
new randomly selected stock not already in the portfolio.
We construct M = 10, 000 n-stock portfolios for each n = 1..N , unless the number of
combinations of n stocks out of N available is lower than M . For example, when n = 1,
the number of unique single security portfolios equals N and when n = N only one equally
weighted portfolio can be constructed - we define it as the market portfolio.11 If N is the
total number of stocks available in the market at any given time, the n-combination of N
stocks is equal to the binomial coefficient
(
N
n
)
= N !
n!(N−n)!
. Accounting for all possible
combinations is likely to be beyond the capability of even the most modern hardware. We
find that 10,000 replications are sufficient to give a robust measure of central tendency of
our risk measures.
For each stock j at time t we define returns as
stocks that delisted in March but traded on 90% of trading days prior to delisting). In fact, including the
stocks in the subset (ii) has minimal influence on our overall results. The number of stocks in that subset is
very small and the probability of these stocks being chosen in random portfolios of size up to a maximum of
120 stocks out of the total number of stocks available is relatively low.
10Several studies (Evans and Archer, 1968; Latane and Young, 1969; Fisher and Lorie, 1970; Wagner and
Lau, 1971; Fielitz, 1974; Klemkosky and Martin, 1975; Tole, 1982; Statman, 1987) have conducted statistical
tests for evaluating the significance of the incremental change in reduced unsystematic risk. However, these
approaches are subject to a replication sensitivity problem related to the number of replications. Increasing
the number of replications to construct random portfolios, and thus reducing the estimation error, can lead to
conflicting results. For large numbers of replications, these statistical tests may find significant but irrelevant
differences in the risk measure. This problem is only partially mitigated in Beck et al. (1996). Consequently,
we do not use this approach in this paper.
11We prefer equally weighted portfolios to value weighted ones, because when randomly drawing stocks we
would like to avoid situations when one stock’s weight is disproportionally large (a mega cap stock) relative
to other portfolio constituents (all micro cap for the sake of argument). Essentially, that portfolio would
be equivalent to a single stock portfolio, where the mega cap stock dominates. Fama makes a similar point
in discussing cumulative abnormal returns (see Fama, 1998, p.296, Section 4.2.3. The return metric: value
weights versus equal weights).
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rj,t = log (Pj,t)− log (Pj,t−1) , (1)
where Pj,t is the total return index inclusive of dividends. For n = 1..N the return of the
n-stock equally weighted random portfolio i at time t is defined as12
Rni,t ≈
n∑
j=1
{rj,t}i
n
(2)
and the average time series return over time t = 1..T of portfolio i can be expressed as
R¯ni =
T∑
t=1
Rni,t
T
. (3)
Let Ωni represent a risk measure of an n-stock portfolio i. We define the average risk
metric of M portfolios, each of size n, as follows:
Ωn =
M∑
i=1
Ωni
M
. (4)
Most studies define the location of a sample center as in (4) above. A few studies use
median as a central tendency for the risk metric. Our preference is for the former.
When equally weighted, the market portfolio consisting of all available securities is a
unique portfolio, and ΩN = ΩN . If Ω1 and ΩN are risk metrics for the average single-stock
and market portfolios, we can define several measures of diversification, η (n), for an n-stock
portfolio. The first measure is an unscaled and unstandardised risk measure. It is simply
defined as the average risk metric, η1 (n) = Ωn, and is consistent with those in Evans and
Archer (1968); Fielitz (1974); Johnson and Shannon (1974); Beck et al. (1996); Brands and
Gallagher (2005). Using this measure of diversification, as n→ N , the asymptote approaches
market risk, ΩN (see Figure 2 panel A).
The second measure, showing only idiosyncratic risk, is consistent with definitions in
Klemkosky and Martin (1975) and Kryzanowski and Singh (2010). It is adjusted for market
risk and can be represented, in general form, as η2 (n) = Ωn−Ω
N . In this case the asymptote
approaches 0 as the number of stocks in the portfolio increases.
The third measure is standardized by Ω1 and is consistent with those in Solnik (1974);
O’Neal (1997); Tang (2004). It can be expressed as η3 (n) = Ωn/Ω1. The asymptote in this
case represents the percentage of the average security risk that cannot be diversified away.
The following standardization, η4 (n) = Ωn/Ω
N , is also useful. In this case, when n = 1,
the measure shows how many times the average security risk is higher than market risk. As
12We use log returns rather than simple returns because, expressed as simple returns, a 10% loss in
stock value and a subsequent 10% gain does not leave the investor with the same wealth. Log returns
provide symmetric interpretation of gains and losses alleviating the skewness symptom. We recognize that
aggregating log returns cross-sectionally is not the same as the log of aggregated simple returns, however, the
difference is small when returns are measured over short intervals of time, and are therefore close to zero (see
Campbell et al., 1997), as in the case with daily returns employed in this study, and does not qualitatively
affect our relative measure of diversification presented below in equation 5.
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Figure 2: Risk as a function of portfolio size.
the number of stocks in the portfolio increases, the measure approaches 1 from above. We
are unaware of any studies using this representation but include it here for completeness.
Since we are using different measures of risk across different subperiods and countries, and
to aid in our comparison, we require a normalised measure that adjusts for both the average
security risk and for the level of market risk. To obtain the required number of securities for
portfolios with a given level of diversifiable risk, we define a measure exclusively focused on
diversifiable risk that is bounded between 0 and 1 as follows:
η5 (n) =
Ωn − ΩN
Ω1 − ΩN
. (5)
The graph in Figure 2 panel (B) illustrates this measure with a solid curve.
In addition, for a series of random draws of n-stock portfolios, let Ωnq be a qth percentile
of a risk measure Ωn. Similar to (5) we define:
η5 (n, q) =
Ωnq − Ω
N
Ω1 − ΩN
. (6)
We depict (6) in Figure 2 panel (B) with a dashed curve. The advantage of the risk
measures in (5) and (6) is that they can be used to compare diversification benefits across
time periods and against other risk measures.
When the market model holds and the variance of portfolio returns is used as the risk
measure, equation (5) is the level of idiosyncratic risk of an n-stock portfolio relative to the
average level of idiosyncratic risk of a single security.
Because, in the finance literature, measuring risk is more contentious than measuring
return, we consider several types of risk measures. Our first measure is time series standard
deviation (SD), a well accepted measurement of risk of a financial asset or portfolio. This
measure allows us to compare our results with those in previous studies. Other important
risk measures are downside (or tail) risk measures. Downside risk measures account for
deviations below a certain threshold, unlike standard deviation, where positive and negative
deviations from the expected level are penalized equally. One advantage of downside risk
measures is that they account, to some extent, for the asymmetries in returns during bull and
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bear markets. For this purpose, we use the expected shortfall (ES) measure. An additional
conceptually different measure, reported in this study, is terminal wealth standard deviation
(TWSD) that assumes no portfolio re-balancing during the period (see Section 2.3 below).
2.1. Time series standard deviation
When the risk metric is the standard deviation of a portfolio, we define it as follows:13
Ωni ≡ σ
n
i =
√√√√ T∑
t=1
(
Rni,t − R¯
n
i
)2
T − 1
(7)
and the average standard deviation of M random portfolios, each of size n is
σn =
M∑
i=1
σni
M
. (8)
Despite its drawbacks, standard deviation is the most used measure of risk in the finance
literature.14
2.2. Expected Shortfall
Expected shortfall (ES) satisfies the subadditivity condition and provides a natural ex-
tension to VaR. In fact, expected shortfall at level α, ESα, can be defined as the expected
value of the losses exceeding V aRα.
15
We estimate expected shortfall from the portfolio returns. Let Rni,t,α be the empirical αth
quantile. We define:
Ωni ≡ ES
n
α,i = −
1
Tα
T∑
t=1
Rni,t1
(
Rni,t ≤ R
n
i,t,α
)
(9)
where 1 (.) = 1 if Rni,t ≤ R
n
i,t,α and 0 otherwise, and Tα denotes the number of R
n
i,t no greater
than Rni,t,α.
We choose expected shortfall at the 1% level, ES1%, as our measure of downside risk.
16
When we estimate extreme risk measures, we are faced with a dilemma. We realize that mar-
ket conditions change from one year to the next and so do the estimates of extreme measures.
13Although the formula in (7) is not adjusted for possible serial correlation (e.g., see French et al., 1987),
we use this unadjusted measure as our benchmark both to compare with previous research on diversification
and as the measure most frequently used by practitioners.
14We have also estimated our results using equation (5) with mean absolute deviation (MAD), median
absolute deviation, and variance as measures of risk. These results are similar to those obtained with SD.
15If the underlying distribution for portfolio returns, X , is a continuous distribution then the expected
shortfall is defined by ESα (X) = E [−X |X ≤ −V aRα (X))]. See Artzner et al., 1997; Annaert et al., 2009.
For an excellent summary of risk measures see also Szego, 2002.
16In addition, we have obtained results using equation (5) with ES10%, ES5% (using the same estimation
procedure as for ES1%) as well as lower partial moments (e.g., semi-variance). These results are similar
to those obtained with the SD measure. However, focusing on extreme (black swan) events, ES1% yields
considerably different results. This suggests that measures that focus on the extreme tails provide intrinsically
different results than measures that utilize the larger portion of the distribution.
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Taking one year as a sub-period provides us on average with 250 daily observations sufficient
to get a sensible historical estimate for ES10% or ES5%. However, this sample size is not
nearly enough to get a good historical estimate for ES1%. Even if we take a rolling 3 year
period and increase our sample to approximately 750 daily observations, the estimate of the
ES1% is not satisfactory. Instead, we use a model-based simulation approach to increase the
size of the sample for the particular subperiod in order to get a more reliable estimate. For
each n = 1..N and each portfolio draw m = 1..M in each annual period from 1975 to 2011
and for each country, we perform GARCH filtration by using the GJR(1,1) model (Glosten
et al., 1993) as our parametric benchmark for each of the simulated portfolios. By adopting
this model we account for some stylised facts commonly attributed to financial time series.
Namely, we control for autoregressive and conditional heteroskedasticity and the asymmetry
in the conditional variances. In addition, by estimating the GJR model with t-distributed
disturbances, we compensate for the presence of fat tails in equity portfolio returns. Once
we estimate the model parameters, we standardise the residuals by the estimated conditional
standard deviation to obtain a zero mean and unit variance disturbance. We use a semi-
parametric approach to estimate the distribution of these standardised residuals: the 10%
lower and upper tails are estimated parametrically by fitting a Generalized Pareto Distri-
bution using the peak over threshold (POT) approach (Pickands, 1975; Davison and Smith,
1990). We estimate the middle, 10%-90%, of the distribution non parametrically using nor-
mal kernel smoothing. We sample the residuals from the resulting estimated distributions
which we then use in the estimated GJR(1,1) models to obtain simulated observations. This
allows us to simulate samples of lengths greater than the 250 trading days in a typical year.
We find that 10,000 observations give us a reliable estimate of ES1% .
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2.3. Terminal Wealth Standard Deviation
Similar to O’Neal (1997), Brands and Gallagher (2005) and Benjelloun (2010) we use
terminal wealth standard deviation (TWSD) as one of the risk measures.18 The advantage
of using this risk measure is that while it is independent of the data frequency within the
investment horizon, it does rely on the length of the investment horizon.
The terminal wealth of the n-stock equally weighted random portfolio i at time t is
defined as
TW ni =
T∑
t=1
Rni,t (10)
and the terminal wealth standard deviation can be expressed as
TWSDn =
√√√√ M∑
i=1
(
TW ni − TW
n
)2
M − 1
(11)
17We performed simulations to check the convergence of ES1% for sample lengths from 250 to 50,000 in
250 increments. Results are available upon request.
18They use simple returns and compute terminal wealth as TWni =
∏T
t=1
(
1 +Rni,t
)
.
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Figure 3: United States. In panel (A) the solid line shows the annualized standard deviation within each
month of daily market returns based on the past 12 months’ returns. The dashed line represents the average
security standard deviation. Panel (B) depicts ES1% of the market portfolio (solid line) and the average
security ES1% (dashed line). Panel (C) shows the average security correlation with the market portfolio
(solid line) and the average correlation among securities (dashed line). Shaded regions in the figure represent
periods of crises and correspond to events presented in Table 2.
where TW n =
∑M
i=1
TWni
M
is the average terminal wealth over M portfolios.19 Thus, the
TWSD risk measure accounts for the volatility of terminal wealth.
3. Results
Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4 summarize our findings for the US market. It is interesting to
note that in 2008 (see Figure 3.A), the average security standard deviation was only two times
the standard deviation of the market, due to the fact that the overall market risk was one of
19Adopting the idea behind the Sortino measure that deviations above the market terminal wealth should
not be penalized and following O’Neal (1997), we calculate the terminal wealth standard semi-deviation
(TWSSD). We find that the number of stocks required in an optimal portfolio is similar to our results using
TWSD as a measure of risk.
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Figure 4: United States. Recommended portfolio size to achieve 90% reduction in diversifiable
risk. The solid dark line represents the number of stocks recommended for an average investor to achieve 90%
reduction in diversifiable risk when standard deviation is used as a risk measure. To achieve this reduction
90% of the time, portfolio size is depicted by the dashed dark line. Similarly, for investors concerned with
extreme risk and using ES1% as the risk measure, the portfolio size for an average investor is depicted by
the solid light line and the size of the portfolio that assures this reduction 90% of the time is shown by
the dashed light line. For investors concerned with terminal wealth standard deviation, our recommended
portfolio size is shown by the dark solid line with circles. Shaded regions in the figure represent periods of
crises and correspond to events presented in Table 2.
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Figure 5: United Kingdom. In panel (A) the solid line shows the annualized standard deviation within
each month of daily market returns based on the past 12 months’ returns. The dashed line represents the
average security standard deviation. Panel (B) depicts ES1% of the market portfolio (solid line) and the
average security ES1% (dashed line). Panel (C) shows the average security correlation with the market
portfolio (solid line) and the average correlation among securities (dashed line). Shaded regions in the figure
represent periods of crises and correspond to events presented in Table 2.
the highest. Similarly, Figure 3.B depicts the average security ES1% relative to ES1% of the
overall market. For the average security, ES1% was closer to the market’s during the 1987
crash, but not as close to the market’s ES1% during the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis
(GFC). This difference may be due to the rise of globalization since 1987 when many more
international firms were listed on US markets, and the sectoral composition of US markets
was increasingly diversified. Consistent with Campbell et al. (2001), we observe that an
increase in idiosyncratic risk means that more stocks are required to diversify portfolios.
This is coupled with declining average correlations among stocks. We observe that the
higher the correlations among stocks in the market, the lower the number of stocks required
to diversify the portfolio of an average investor. This happens because in periods when
correlations among stocks are high, selecting fewer stocks will achieve the desired level of
idiosyncratic risk reduction (the market is comprised of these highly correlated stocks), and
since we are diversifying idiosyncratic risk, and in a perfectly diversified portfolio, the risk
13
Figure 6: United Kingdom. Recommended portfolio size to achieve 90% reduction in diversi-
fiable risk. The solid dark line represents the number of stocks recommended for an average investor to
achieve 90% reduction in diversifiable risk when standard deviation is used as a risk measure. To achieve
this reduction 90% of the time, portfolio size is depicted by the dashed dark line. Similarly, for investors
concerned with extreme risk and using ES1% as the risk measure, the portfolio size for an average investor
is depicted by the solid light line and the size of the portfolio that assures this reduction 90% of the time is
shown by the dashed light line. For investors concerned with terminal wealth standard deviation, our rec-
ommended portfolio size is shown by the dark solid line with circles. Shaded regions in the figure represent
periods of crises and correspond to events presented in Table 2.
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Figure 7: Japan. In panel (A) the solid line shows the annualized standard deviation within each month of
daily market returns based on the past 12 months’ returns. The dashed line represents the average security
standard deviation. Panel (B) depicts ES1% of the market portfolio (solid line) and the average security
ES1% (dashed line). Panel (C) shows the average security correlation with the market portfolio (solid line)
and the average correlation among securities (dashed line). Shaded regions in the figure represent periods of
crises and correspond to events presented in Table 2.
will consist only of market risk.
For example, in the US, between 1991 and 2001 (Fig 3.A), the gap between average
security standard deviation and market standard deviation widened, while the average cor-
relations among stocks declined (Figure 3.C), resulting in an increased number of stocks
required to diversify a portfolio (Figure 4 solid dark line). In the period 2002 to 2007, the
gap between average security standard deviation and market standard deviation began to
shrink (Figure 3.A), average correlations among stocks started to increase (Figure 3.C), re-
sulting in a declining required number of stocks (Figure 4 solid dark line). Between 2008
and 2011, a period characterized by the GFC, the gap between average security standard
deviation and market standard deviation remained narrow, average correlations spiked up
to a level comparable to the period of the flash crash of 1989, resulting in a much reduced
number of stocks required to diversify a portfolio (Figure 4). When ES is used as a measure
of risk rather than SD, we observe similar trends in every period but with a reduced number
15
Figure 8: Japan. Recommended portfolio size to achieve 90% reduction in diversifiable risk.
The solid dark line represents the number of stocks recommended for an average investor to achieve 90%
reduction in diversifiable risk when standard deviation is used as a risk measure. To achieve this reduction
90% of the time, portfolio size is depicted by the dashed dark line. Similarly, for investors concerned with
extreme risk and using ES1% as the risk measure, the portfolio size for an average investor is depicted by
the solid light line and the size of the portfolio that assures this reduction 90% of the time is shown by
the dashed light line. For investors concerned with terminal wealth standard deviation, our recommended
portfolio size is shown by the dark solid line with circles. Shaded regions in the figure represent periods of
crises and correspond to dates presented in Table 2.
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Figure 9: Canada. In panel (A) the solid line shows the annualized standard deviation within each month of
daily market returns based on the past 12 months’ returns. The dashed line represents the average security
standard deviation. Panel (B) depicts ES1% of the market portfolio (solid line) and the average security
ES1% (dashed line). Panel (C) shows the average security correlation with the market portfolio (solid line)
and the average correlation among securities (dashed line). Shaded regions in the figure represent periods of
crises and correspond to events presented in Table 2.
of stocks required to diversify a portfolio (Figure 4 solid light vs. solid dark lines).
We note from Figure 3.C (dashed line) a downward trend in average correlations among
stocks in the US from 1975 to 2000 and the reversal of this trend between 2000 and 2011,
including the period 2002 to 2007 when the economy was not in crisis. The declining trend
was first reported by Campbell et al. for the period 1960 to 2000 (see Figure 5.A in Campbell
et al., 2001, p.24 ), but we find that this trend reversed itself soon after their paper was
published. After 2000, increased correlations among stocks made it easier to achieve portfolio
diversification with a small number of stocks, as can be seen in Figure 4. From Figure 3.A
we observe that in the period 1975-2007 market volatility has been relatively stable (solid
line) whereas the average security volatility has increased since 1989.20
20This is consistent with Campbell et al. (2001).
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Figure 10: Canada. Recommended portfolio size to achieve 90% reduction in diversifiable risk.
The solid dark line represents the number of stocks recommended for an average investor to achieve 90%
reduction in diversifiable risk when standard deviation is used as a risk measure. To achieve this reduction
90% of the time, portfolio size is depicted by the dashed dark line. Similarly, for investors concerned with
extreme risk and using ES1% as the risk measure, the portfolio size for an average investor is depicted by
the solid light line and the size of the portfolio that assures this reduction 90% of the time is shown by
the dashed light line. For investors concerned with terminal wealth standard deviation, our recommended
portfolio size is shown by the dark solid line with circles. Shaded regions in the figure represent periods of
crises and correspond to events presented in Table 2.
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Figure 11: Australia. In panel (A) the solid line shows the annualized standard deviation within each
month of daily market returns based on the past 12 months’ returns. The dashed line represents the average
security standard deviation. Panel (B) depicts ES1% of the market portfolio (solid line) and the average
security ES1% (dashed line). Panel (C) shows the average security correlation with the market portfolio
(solid line) and the average correlation among securities (dashed line). Shaded regions in the figure represent
periods of crises and correspond to events presented in Table 2.
Figure 4 and Table 1 (columns 1 to 3) show the average number of stocks required
to achieve 90% reduction in diversifiable risk as defined by equation (5). Using standard
deviation as the measure of risk, an average investor (solid dark line) must hold from 16 to
31 stocks (see Table 1 column 1). This result is stable across all years with only a slight
increase in the number of stocks required in the period 1990 to 2007. Looking at the dashed
dark line in Figure 4, we note that an investor who wants to achieve a 90% diversifiable
risk reduction with 90% certainty instead of on average, should hold a portfolio comprised
of 39-73 stocks (see also Table 1 column 1a). The number of stocks to achieve this level of
certainty, i.e., to reduce 90% of diversifiable risk 90% of the time, increases during periods
when markets are in financial distress (for example, in Table 1 column 1a 49-51 stocks in
19
Figure 12: Australia. Recommended portfolio size to achieve 90% reduction in diversifiable risk.
The solid dark line represents the number of stocks recommended for an average investor to achieve 90%
reduction in diversifiable risk when standard deviation is used as a risk measure. To achieve this reduction
90% of the time, portfolio size is depicted by the dashed dark line. Similarly, for investors concerned with
extreme risk and using ES1% as the risk measure, the portfolio size for an average investor is depicted by
the solid light line and the size of the portfolio that assures this reduction 90% of the time is shown by
the dashed light line. For investors concerned with terminal wealth standard deviation, our recommended
portfolio size is shown by the dark solid line with circles. Shaded regions in the figure represent periods of
crises and correspond to events presented in Table 2.
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1988-1989 following the market crash in 1987, 50-60 stocks from 2000 to 200221 right after the
burst of the Dot Com Bubble, and 56-73 stocks in 2008-2011 during the GFC). During such
periods, events which normally would not threaten a firm’s survival might lead to bankruptcy
or takeover. Thus, investors need a larger number of stocks to guard against diversifiable
risk with this level of certainty.
From 1975 to 2011 (Figure 4 and Table 1 column 2), using ES1% as a measure of risk,
the solid light line shows that average investors need to hold in their portfolios 10 stocks
(in 1987-1988) to 24 stocks (in 2004-2005) to reduce the ES1% diversifiable risk by 90%.
However, Table 1 column 2a and the dashed light line in Figure 4 indicate that to achieve
this reduction with 90% certainty for most years, a portfolio of 33 to 55 holdings is required,
with exceptions in 1977-1981 (50-64 stocks), 1987-1989 (109-113 stocks) and 2008-2011 (63-
72 stocks). The solid line with circles (in Figure 4) represents the number of portfolio holding
requirements using terminal wealth standard deviation as a measure of risk which is always
higher than the number based on the standard deviation and ES1% measures. It is relatively
constant throughout the period requiring on average holdings of 83-99 stocks (Table 1 column
3) to reduce the level of diversifiable risk by 90%.
Turning our attention to the UK market results in Table 1, columns 4 to 6 and Figures
5 and 6, we observe that 1978-1986 was the period with the highest number of holdings
in portfolios of an average investor concerned with standard deviation as a measure of risk
(25-36 stocks in Table 1 column 4). After 1986, a relatively low number of stock holdings
is required to achieve 90% reduction in diversifiable risk (14-22 stocks). For UK investors
concerned with standard deviation as a measure of risk (shown by the dark dashed line in
Figure 6), it would have been advisable to hold 29-66 stocks to eliminate 90% of diversifiable
risk with 90% assurance over the entire period (Table 1 column 4a). The results based
on ES1% (Table 1 column 5) require, on average, holding 9-23 securities to achieve 90%
diversification risk reduction. It is, however, apparent from Figure 6 that for an average
investor the number of stocks required to achieve the 90% reduction in diversifiable risk
based on ES1% is lower than when based on SD. To assure UK investors of achieving this
level of risk reduction with 90% certainty based on the ES1% measure, anywhere from 27 to
60 stocks are advisable with the exception of the market crash in 1987 and the following two
years where 105-129 stocks are recommended. Using TWSD as a risk measure, an average
investor should have held 85-95 stocks to eliminate 90% of diversifiable risk from 1975 to
1988; 63-66 stocks, a substantially lower requirement, from 1990 to 1998; 66-86 stocks, a
steadily increasing requirement from 1999 and 2011 (Table 1 column 6 and Figure 6, solid
line with circles).
The correlation analysis we perform for the US carries over for the UK. In the period
from 1975 to just before Black Monday 1987, the average correlation among stocks was the
lowest and declining (Figure 5.C), resulting in an increasing number of stocks required in
diversified portfolios (Figure 6 solid dark line). The sudden jump in the average correlations
among stocks in 1987 and their slow decline until 2000 resulted in a drop in the number of
stocks required for portfolio diversification (Figure 6 solid dark line).
Results for the Japanese financial market (Figures 7 and 8) present an interesting feature:
21In Table 2 we cross-reference the recommended portfolio sizes during crises.
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prior to 1987, average correlations and market volatility were among the lowest. During that
period, we find a narrow difference between portfolio sizes needed to achieve diversification
for an average investor compared to when this diversification is assured 90% of the time
(Figure 8 difference between solid dark line and dashed dark line). This changes after 1986
when the difference grows considerably. The period is also characterized by an increased level
in average correlations among stocks and increased volatility in the market (Figures 7 Panels
C, A and B). From 1975 to 1986 using standard deviation as a risk measure, 20-27 stocks
were needed, but to assure 90% certainty of the 90% risk reduction between 32-39 stocks were
required. However, between 1987 and 2011 using standard deviation as a risk measure, 14-20
stocks were required, but to assure 90% certainty of the 90% risk reduction between 26-53
stocks were needed. We observe similar patterns when risk is measured as ES1%. We define
these contemporaneous gaps in portfolio size recommendations as ∆n (see Table 3 Panel D).
For Japan, note that large gaps (∆n) correspond to periods of high correlations (ρ¯im) and
high market volatility (σm). Japan experienced the lowest average correlations among stocks
in the period 1975 to 1986, which coincides with the largest number of stocks recommended
in a diversified portfolio for an average investor (Figure 8 solid dark line). Correlations
among stocks steadily increase from 1986 to 1992 (Figure 7.C) while the number of stocks
required for portfolio diversification declines (Figure 8 solid dark line). This period for Japan
is marked by the bursting of the asset bubble and the First Gulf War. Between 1992 and
2001, average correlations trend down (Figure 7.C) while the number of stocks required for
portfolio diversification increases. From 2001 and 2011, average correlations among stocks
experience a sharp increase matched by a declining number of stocks required for portfolio
diversification. When risk is measured as TWSD (Table 1 column 9 or Figure 8), however,
the number of stocks required is stable across the 1975 to 2011 period ranging from 82 to 97
stocks.
For the Canadian market, in Table 1, columns 10-12 and Figure 10, we observe that
between 1992 and 2005 the average investor needed to hold a higher number of stocks (26-
39 stocks) as did the investor wishing to reduce diversifiable risk with 90% certainty (34-
52 stocks) compared to the period 1975 to 1991. This is a consequence of higher average
correlations among stocks in the earlier period compared to the later period (see Figure 9.C).
The general trend is consistent with the US markets; however, the average US investor in the
period from 1992 to 2006 required a portfolio consisting of 24 to 31 stocks to achieve a 90%
reduction in diversifiable risk as measured by standard deviation, while the average Canadian
investor required 26-39 stocks. Given the closeness of the US and Canadian economies, we are
not surprised to find similarities between required portfolio holdings in the US and Canada
compared to different requirements in the UK, Japan or Australia.
The recession period for Canada between 1992 to 2004 was marked by a wide gap between
average security standard deviation and market standard deviation (Figure 9.A), the lowest
average correlation among stocks (Figure 9.C), and the largest number of stocks required to
diversify portfolio risk (Figure 10 solid dark line). When ES is used as a measure of risk,
we observe similar trends in every period but with a reduced number of stocks required to
diversify a portfolio, except during the flash crash on Black Monday 1987 (Figure 10 solid
light and dark lines).
For Australian investors concerned with standard deviation as a measure of risk, portfolios
on average require 14-30 stocks (Table 1, column 13 and Figure 12, solid dark line). But from
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1991 to 2007, investors had to hold a slightly larger portfolio (22-30 stocks) to achieve 90% in
diversifiable risk on average. Between 1975 and 1987, to assure the 90% reduction 90% of the
time, Australian investors needed to hold 31-39 stocks. Between 1988 to 2011 portfolio size
increased to 34-52 stocks (Table 1, column 13a and Figure 12, dashed dark line). Consistent
with the results from analyzing other countries, the portfolio size recommendations for an
average Australian investor based on ES1% are generally lower by 5-7 stocks over the entire
period when compared with SD. To achieve 90% reduction in risk with 90% certainty, a
similar pattern emerges except when financial markets are in distress.
Australia prominently displays the negative relationship between average correlation
among stocks and the number of stocks required for portfolio diversification. At the same
time the gap between average security standard deviation and market standard deviation
(Fig 11.A) remains relatively stable through the whole period. The periods of financial dis-
tress (1987-1989, 2008-2011) and the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) are characterized by
the highest average correlations (Figure 11.C) and a reduced number of stocks required for
portfolio diversification (Figure 12 solid dark line). When ES is used as a measure of risk,
we observe similar trends in every period but with a reduced number of stocks required to
diversify a portfolio, except during the First Gulf War in 1990-1992 (Figure 12 solid light
and dark lines).
We note that average correlations among stocks differ from country to country (Panels
C in Figures 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 and Panel B in Table 3). On average, we find the highest
correlations among individual stocks (see Table 3 Panel B) in Japan (0.16), followed by the
US (0.13) and the UK (0.13). The lowest correlations among stocks are in Canada (0.08) and
Australia (0.07). We confirm that the higher the correlation among stocks in the market,
the lower the number of stocks required to diversify the portfolio for an average investor (see
Table 3 Panels A and B). For each country, when market volatilities and correlations are
lower, recommended portfolio sizes are higher. Conversely, when volatilities and correlations
are higher fewer stocks are required to obtain most diversification benefits (Table 3 Panel C).
For example, in the US, small portfolios of less than 19 stocks are recommended in periods
with an average correlation of 0.50 and an increased market volatility of 23.7%. In contrast,
larger portfolios of 26 stocks or more are recommended in periods with an average correlation
of 0.24 and a market volatility of 11.5%. In Table 3 Panel D we show the spread between the
number of stocks required to assure investors of the desired level of diversification 90% of the
time and the portfolio size for the average investor (defined as △n).22 For the US, a spread
of fewer than 20 stocks (△n < 20 in Table 3 Panel D) is associated with market volatility
of 10.9% and an average correlation of 0.27; a spread of more than 31 stocks is associated
with a market volatility of 23.7% and an average correlation of 0.45. One exception is the
UK, where spreads of fewer than 17 stocks are associated with an average correlation of 0.34
whereas for spreads greater than 27 stocks, the average correlation is only marginally higher
(0.36). This means that in periods of high market volatility and large correlations among
stocks, conservative investors need to add more stocks to the portfolios recommended for
average investors to assure a reduction in risk 90% of the time.
During periods of extreme market volatility or market crashes (black swan events), it
22Refer to the difference between the dashed and solid lines in Figures 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12.
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is not surprising that when we use measures of extreme risk such as ES1%, the portfolio
size requirements to achieve the desired level of diversification with 90% certainty increase
dramatically, even doubling for the US and the UK (refer to Table 1, ’Average’ row at bottom
vs. columns 2a, 5a, 8a, 11a, and 14a). Using TWSD as a risk measure (Table 1 column 15
and Figure 12, solid line with circles), in the period 1975-1988, an average Australian investor
would have held 52-57 stocks (compared to 85-95 in the UK) to eliminate 90% of diversifiable
risk, with a substantially lower requirement (43-49 stocks) in 1989-1990 and incrementally
and steadily increasing portfolio sizes from 1991 (55 stocks) to 2011 (81 stocks).
The period from 1975 to 2011 allows us to account for some significant events in finan-
cial market history. We conclude that portfolio sizes are determined by the particular risk
measure used and by market conditions including correlations among stocks. We identify
two types of crises, general drops in the market (1987 and 2008-2011) and industry specific
meltdowns (2000-2002).23 Such crises are characterized by a few common features. In the
case of market crashes, we note increased market risk measured by SD and especially ES1%
coupled with greatly increased average correlations among securities as well as the correlation
of the average security with the market portfolio (see Figures 3, 5, 7, 9, 11). During market
crashes in the US, Figure 4 (solid dark line) shows that the number of stocks required for an
average investor to obtain a 90% reduction in diversifiable risk using standard deviation as
a measure decreases. But at the same time, we observe an increase in the number of stocks
required to achieve the same level of diversification but with 90% confidence. For the average
US investor, Tables 1 and 2 confirm that during major stock market crashes (1987,1989, and
2008) the number of stocks required to eliminate 90% of diversifiable risk was the lowest
(16-17 stocks when risk is measured by SD and 9-10 stocks when risk is measured by ES1%).
The number of stocks required to achieve the same level of diversification but with 90%
confidence was the highest across all periods when risk is measured as ES1% (71-113 stocks).
This result generally holds across all five markets.
In the case of industry specific meltdowns, such as the collapse of LTCM and the bursting
of the Dot Com bubble, the market experienced high volatility. The average correlations
among securities within the market and with the market portfolio, however, were among the
lowest (Figures 3, 5, 7, 9, 11). As shown for the US in Figure 4, more stocks are needed to get
the desired level of diversification. One interpretation of the findings in this paper is that the
recommended number of stocks in a buy-and-hold portfolio to attain on average (or with a
particular degree of certainty) a reduction in diversifiable risk should not be based on results
in periods when markets are in distress. Rather, as shown in Figure 4, during 2008-2010,
US long term investors should instead conservatively rely on results obtained during normal
financial market periods opting for larger portfolios (see also Table 3 Panel D).
Our results for other risk measures for 10% and 5% expected shortfall, lower partial
moments (e.g., semi-variance) are very similar to the results when the risk measure used is
standard deviation but are excluded from this paper for brevity’s sake.24
23The OECD dated recessions (business cycle analysis database, http://stats.oecd.org) during the period
of our study do not appear to have had an impact on the number of stocks needed for diversifying specific
risk, unless these recessions coincide with financial market meltdowns.
24The results and figures are available from the authors upon request.
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4. Conclusion
In this study of five developed markets (the US, the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia) we
analyse the required size of portfolios needed to achieve most diversification benefits. Using
daily data, we trace the year-to-year dynamic of required portfolio sizes between 1975 and
2011. We compute several widely-accepted measures of risk: standard deviation, expected
shortfall at 1%, and terminal wealth standard deviation. This is the first empirical study to
use an extreme risk measure to account for black swan events related to the recent Global
Financial Crisis, as well as the more common asymmetries in returns during bull and bear
markets. We find that investors concerned with extreme risk can achieve diversification
benefits with a relatively small number of stocks.
We find that the correlation structures in the five markets change during periods of
financial market distress. With the exception of the UK’s financial market, we note that the
downward trend in average correlations among stocks reported by Campbell et al. for the
US between 1960 and 2000, reversed itself between 2000 and 2011, including the period 2002
to 2007 when the economy was not in crisis. Increased correlations among stocks after 2000,
made portfolio diversification easier to achieve with a small number of stocks. Periods of
market-wide crises and industry-specific meltdowns present different correlation structures.
This has important implications for recommended portfolio sizes.
While the average all domestic US equity funds hold from 49 to 129 stocks, we find that
these numbers are larger than the number of stocks required to assure 90% of the time a 90%
reduction in diversifiable risk using both SD and ES. At the same time Ivkovic et al. (2008,
Table 1, p.619) report that individual investors, as opposed to institutional investors in the
US, hold between 3.9 and 11.7 stocks on average in their portfolios. We recommend that
professional portfolio managers who use standard deviation as a measure of risk, and who
seek to reduce 90% of diversifiable risk 90% percent of the time, instead of on average, should
hold 49 stocks in the US; 43 in the UK; 39 in Japan; 40 in Canada; and 38 in Australia.
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1978 23 (45) 17 (63) 88 26 (47) 15 (39) 92 24 (35) 15 (27) 82 18 (23) 16 (25) 34 25 (31) 20 (26) 53
1979 20 (42) 13 (50) 89 26 (44) 20 (35) 87 24 (35) 15 (28) 89 19 (32) 14 (36) 44 27 (34) 21 (29) 54
1980 20 (45) 14 (64) 92 27 (46) 20 (38) 91 27 (38) 14 (27) 90 17 (36) 14 (52) 49 25 (34) 19 (28) 56
1981 19 (42) 14 (61) 93 25 (47) 14 (37) 93 26 (38) 16 (31) 83 17 (38) 13 (50) 51 23 (34) 18 (28) 56
1982 19 (41) 13 (49) 91 26 (52) 18 (52) 92 26 (39) 15 (27) 88 17 (37) 14 (50) 54 23 (36) 19 (28) 57
1983 20 (42) 13 (34) 91 29 (55) 18 (60) 86 26 (38) 16 (29) 88 18 (35) 14 (33) 49 22 (34) 18 (28) 54
1984 20 (39) 17 (35) 94 36 (66) 23 (51) 92 26 (38) 13 (24) 91 24 (40) 22 (54) 48 21 (33) 20 (28) 54
1985 21 (41) 19 (39) 85 32 (46) 19 (39) 85 27 (37) 12 (23) 84 21 (31) 24 (41) 43 22 (32) 19 (30) 54
1986 22 (42) 19 (48) 91 30 (46) 21 (40) 91 25 (32) 14 (26) 89 25 (36) 31 (45) 41 22 (32) 17 (27) 54
1987 17 (48) 10 (111) 86 20 (48) 12 (105) 88 18 (27) 10 (31) 88 22 (42) 22 (64) 49 18 (39) 13 (45) 57
1988 18 (49) 10 (109) 91 18 (51) 10 (129) 89 18 (28) 10 (33) 87 22 (40) 21 (58) 44 16 (38) 14 (45) 52
1989 16 (51) 9 (113) 91 14 (47) 9 (127) 74 17 (26) 9 (39) 90 18 (31) 15 (37) 40 14 (37) 10 (44) 49
1990 21 (44) 14 (49) 90 17 (32) 11 (38) 63 15 (30) 15 (84) 88 18 (26) 15 (24) 33 21 (34) 28 (45) 43
1991 26 (57) 21 (55) 89 16 (38) 12 (33) 66 15 (35) 12 (65) 93 22 (33) 19 (33) 43 25 (43) 28 (51) 55
1992 24 (42) 16 (41) 95 17 (40) 13 (27) 63 14 (38) 13 (52) 89 26 (34) 22 (32) 47 25 (40) 26 (47) 57
1993 26 (43) 16 (40) 94 17 (37) 14 (32) 64 15 (37) 13 (45) 87 30 (43) 27 (41) 54 26 (38) 25 (48) 60
1994 29 (43) 19 (38) 96 16 (35) 14 (33) 65 15 (39) 12 (45) 90 34 (45) 22 (34) 64 26 (38) 27 (49) 62
1995 31 (46) 17 (33) 96 18 (29) 14 (27) 65 16 (36) 10 (43) 92 36 (44) 22 (31) 72 25 (36) 18 (33) 62
1996 30 (47) 17 (34) 94 22 (49) 21 (41) 65 17 (35) 11 (41) 90 39 (51) 27 (53) 76 24 (37) 15 (26) 68
1997 29 (46) 17 (37) 95 18 (31) 12 (28) 65 18 (43) 16 (66) 93 37 (49) 21 (38) 80 22 (38) 13 (34) 69
1998 26 (45) 15 (45) 89 19 (35) 17 (41) 64 17 (50) 14 (69) 91 36 (50) 21 (40) 82 22 (40) 17 (43) 69
1999 28 (45) 14 (33) 99 19 (33) 15 (36) 70 18 (44) 13 (50) 86 37 (49) 20 (34) 84 23 (40) 14 (40) 74
2000 28 (50) 16 (35) 97 20 (37) 16 (33) 66 19 (36) 17 (48) 89 37 (49) 22 (37) 86 28 (42) 18 (37) 71
2001 27 (56) 19 (42) 93 20 (49) 16 (42) 73 20 (34) 19 (55) 89 35 (51) 22 (45) 85 29 (52) 18 (52) 77
2002 25 (60) 18 (41) 94 21 (46) 16 (32) 73 18 (36) 14 (47) 90 31 (51) 21 (42) 79 27 (47) 20 (56) 77
2003 25 (59) 19 (42) 98 19 (46) 17 (36) 71 18 (41) 13 (50) 97 33 (49) 23 (41) 82 27 (42) 18 (39) 75
2004 25 (55) 24 (52) 99 19 (44) 17 (34) 75 18 (43) 11 (78) 92 36 (52) 26 (50) 80 30 (44) 21 (34) 72
2005 26 (50) 24 (41) 94 20 (40) 19 (38) 77 19 (44) 9 (90) 88 33 (51) 23 (43) 85 30 (41) 17 (28) 76
2006 26 (48) 23 (42) 97 22 (36) 14 (35) 77 17 (47) 7 (112) 95 29 (46) 18 (42) 81 28 (44) 15 (30) 80
2007 24 (45) 17 (35) 93 20 (37) 17 (35) 86 17 (48) 8 (64) 92 26 (50) 16 (40) 84 26 (44) 15 (39) 84
2008 16 (56) 10 (71) 93 19 (43) 16 (43) 83 16 (53) 15 (67) 93 21 (48) 16 (55) 86 20 (44) 17 (54) 82
2009 17 (67) 13 (72) 92 19 (42) 15 (45) 83 17 (53) 11 (64) 92 20 (46) 14 (48) 79 20 (41) 14 (54) 84
2010 18 (68) 14 (72) 96 19 (46) 15 (44) 86 17 (50) 10 (63) 89 19 (47) 14 (50) 86 20 (44) 15 (49) 80
2011 18 (73) 14 (63) 94 21 (40) 17 (33) 85 17 (53) 15 (92) 97 22 (46) 16 (36) 87 21 (43) 17 (40) 81
Average 23 (49) 16 (52) 92 21 (43) 16 (44) 79 19 (39) 13 (50) 89 25 (40) 19 (41) 61 24 (38) 18 (38) 64
Table 1: Recommended portfolio size to achieve 90% reduction in diversifiable risk. The table presents the average number of stocks and
the 90th percentile of number of stocks (in parenthesis) based on SD, ES at the 1% level and TWSD as risk measures.
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Event US UK Japan Canada Australia
SD ES1% SD ES1% SD ES1% SD ES1% SD ES1%
The 1973 oil crisis
(1973-1974)
X X X X +
Bear market of
1977-1978
X
23 (45) 17-19
(55-63)
The 1979 (or second) oil
crisis (1979-1982)
X +
19-20
(41-45)
13-14
(49-64)
17-19
(32-38)
13-14
(36-52)
Bear market of
1981-1982
X
23 (34-36) 18-19 (28)
Black Monday (1987)
+ + + + +
17 (48) 10 (111) 20 (48) 12 (105) 18 (27) 10 (31) 22 (42) 22 (64) 18 (39) 13 (45)
Friday the 13th
mini-crash (1989)
X
16 (51) 9 (113)
First Gulf War
(1990-1991)
X X X
21-26
(44-57)
14-21
(49-55)
15 (30-35) 12-15
(65-84)
21-25
(34-33)
28 (45-51)
Japanese Asset Price
bubble (1990-1992)
X
14-15
(30-38)
12-15
(52-84)
Black Wednesday (1992)
+
17 (40) 13 (27)
Bear market of
1996-1998
X
17-18
(35-50)
11-16
(41-69)
Asian Financial Crisis
(1997)
X +
18 (43) 16 (66) 22 (38) 13 (34)
Collapse of LTCM (1998)
+ + + + +
26 (45) 15 (45) 19 (35) 17 (31) 17 (50) 14 (69) 36 (50) 21 (40) 22 (40) 17 (43)
Dot-com bubble
(2000-2002)
X X X X +
25-28
(50-60)
16-19
(35-42)
20-21
(37-49)
16 (32-42) 18-20
(34-36)
14-19
(47-55)
31-37
(49-51)
21-22
(42-45)
27-29
(42-52)
18-20
(37-56)
Global Financial Crisis
(2008)
X X X X X
16 (56) 10 (71) 19 (43) 16 (43) 16 (53) 15 (67) 21 (48) 16 (55) 20 (44) 17 (54)
Table 2: Dates for crises, stock market crashes and their aftermath. Source: Symbol Xrefers to events identified in Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) and Dates for Banking Crises, Currency Crashes, Sovereign Domestic or External Default, Inflation Crises, and Stock Market Crashes webpage
on the authors website: http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/. The symbol + refers to events we include in addition to those identified in Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009): for all five countries in our sample - Black Monday (1987), and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998;
for the UK - Black Wednesday (1992) ; for Australia - the 1973 oil crisis (1973-1974), the Asian Financial Crisis (1997) and the Dot-com bubble
(2000-2002); for Canada - the 1979 oil crisis (1979-1982). The numbers in the SD and ES1% columns represent the range of the number of stocks
required to reduce diversifiable risk by 90% (with 90% certainty).
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Measure US UK Japan Canada Australia
Panel A: Number of stocks required to achieve 90% reduction in diversifiable risk in the period 1975-2011
Based on σ on avg (90% of the time) 23 (49) 21 (43) 19 (39) 25 (40) 24 (38)
Based on ES1% on avg (90% of the time) 16 (52) 16 (44) 13 (50) 19 (41) 18 (38)
Based on TWSD 93 83 89 54 60
Panel B: Stock and market descriptive statistics
ρ¯ij 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.07
ρ¯im 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.27 0.26
σ¯i 43.2% 35.0% 40.4% 52.3% 39.9%
σm 14.7% 12.4% 15.5% 13.4% 10.4%
Panel C: Small vs. Large portfolios and associated market characteristics
Recommended n based on σ <19 >26 <19 >23 <17 >23 <18 >33 <21 >25
ρ¯im 0.50 0.24 0.46 0.24 0.51 0.21 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.21
σm 23.7% 11.5% 13.0% 7.1% 21.2% 7.2% 15.9% 11.1% 16.7% 8.1%
Panel D: Small vs Large difference b/w average and 90th percentile recommended number of holdings
△n based on σ <20 >31 <17 >27 <12 >25 <11 >19 <11 >19
ρ¯im 0.27 0.45 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.44 0.27 0.34 0.21 0.33
σm 10.9% 23.7% 9.5% 14.1% 8.3% 24.1% 10.3% 18.7% 7.5% 16.9%
Table 3: Portfolio size results. Panel A provides the average number of stocks required to diversify on average (and 90% of the time) 90% of
diversifiable risk between 1975 and 2011 using the three risk measures. Panel B details average correlations among individual stocks (ρ¯ij), average
correlations of stocks with the market (ρ¯im), average security standard deviations (σ¯i) and market volatility (σm). Panel C relates recommended
number of stocks with market characteristics. We identify years with the largest recommended portfolio sizes (top 3rd of the sample) and estimate
ρ¯im and σm for these years only. We then identify years with the lowest recommended portfolio sizes (bottom 3rd of the sample) and estimate ρ¯im
and σm for these years only. Panel D is constructed similarly to Panel C but relies on the difference between the number of stocks required to
assure the investor of the desired level of diversification 90% of the time and the portfolio size of the average investor (the difference between the
dashed and solid lines in Figures 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12).
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Online Appendix only
The following pages are intended as a supplement to the main manuscript. The following
pages, figures and tables therein are not referenced in the main manuscript.
In Table 4, we present a detailed summary of the literature.
It is also convenient to represent an alternative standardization such as the the one below:
η4 (n) =
Ωn
ΩN
. (12)
When n = 1, the measure shows how many times the average security risk is higher than
market risk. As the number of stocks in the portfolio increases, the measure approaches 1
from above. Since the market risk level changes from year to year, we pick this particular
measure to facilitate our visual analysis . We depict this measure in panels (A) and (B) of
Figures 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.
The vertical axis in Figure 13.A shows the average level of standard deviation normalized
by the market standard deviation as defined by equation (12) above. For each year from
1975 to 2011, we construct an asymptote and show the average n-stock portfolio standard
deviation for n = 1..20 relative to the market standard deviation for each year. We observe in
Figure 13.A that the average security risk, measured by standard deviation, was at its highest
from 1994 to 1996, amounting to five times greater than the market standard deviation.
Figure 18 depicts recommended portfolio size (color bar) by the level of diversification
(vertical axis) across time (horizontal axis).
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Literature Summary
Table 4. The summary of studies listed chronologically in the first column outlines the period of the study (column
2), the data frequency used (column 3) and the market analysed (column 4). Column 5 lists measures used for (i) risk,
(ii) performance, and (iii) diversification. Stock sample figures (in column 6) represent the sample size of (or the universe of
investable) common stocks in the period considered, unless stated otherwise. Column 7 represents the maximum size of a
portfolio (in terms of the number of stocks used to construct random portfolio). For most of the studies, the market portfolio
proxy is constructed based on equal weighting of all securities available in the market, unless specifically stated otherwise in
column 8. We also note down, in column 9, the number of simulations, M , used to derive the central tendency of a risk
measure of each n-stock portfolio. Column 10 provides the recommendation on the portfolio size required to achieve a
specified level/percentage of diversification in parentheses. Column 11 indicates the sampling procedure used to construct
random portfolios.
Study Period Freq. Market Measures Sample Max
size
Market
proxy
M No. of stocks
(diversif.%)
Sampling
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Evans and
Archer (1968)
1958-1967 semi-
annual
US SD 470 40 60 8-10 uniform
Fisher and
Lorie (1970)
1926-1965 annual US wealth ratios: SD,
MAD, mean
difference, Gini’s
mean difference,
coefficient of
concentration
128 8-16 (85%),
16-32 (90%),
128 (99%)
stratified
sampling
(industry)
Jennings
(1971)
1955-1965 annual US probability of loss,
terminal wealth
all listed NYSE
stocks (≈1715)
full sample,
equally
weighted
15 uniform
Wagner and
Lau (1971)
1960-1970 monthly US SD, β, R2 all listed NYSE
stocks
200 full sample,
equally
weighted
10 20 uniform,
classified
(low risk
vs. high
risk)
Fielitz (1974) 1964-1968 quarterly US MAD, Sharpe,
Treynor
200 20 full sample,
equally
weighted
40 8 uniform
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Study Period Freq. Market Measures Sample Max
size
Market
proxy
M No. of stocks
(diversif.%)
Sampling
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Johnson and
Shannon
(1974)
1965-1972 quarterly US variance 50 17 20 3-7 quadratic
optimiza-
tion
Solnik (1974) 1966-1971 weekly US, UK,
DE, FR,
CH, IT,
BE, NL
SD all listed on
NYSE, AMEX
+300 European
stocks
300 60 10-15 uniform
Klemkosky
and Martin
(1975)
1963-1973 monthly US residual variance,
residual variance
of low vs. high
beta portfolios
350 25 S&P500 350/(2..25)3-17 uniform
Elton and
Gruber
(1977)
analytical - - variance 20 uniform
Bloomfield et
al (1977)
1953-1970 monthly US SD 823-893, 3
subperiods
50 ? 20 ? uniform,
quadratic
optimiza-
tion
Bird and
Tippett
(1986)
1958-1973 monthly AUS SD 188 25 full sample,
equally
weighted
40 10-15 uniform
Statman
(1987)
1926-1984 ? US SD US S&P500 30-40 uniform
Beck et al.
(1996)
1982-1991 monthly US variances,
correlations,
variance ratios
all listed on
NYSE, AMEX
(1221)
70 full sample,
equally
weighted
50,
100,
200,
500,
1000,
2000
14-20 uniform
O’Neal
(1997)
1976-1994 quarterly US TWSD and SD,
mean shortfall,
semi-variance
103 growth and 65
growth and
income funds
30 1000 16-18 FoF uniform
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Study Period Freq. Market Measures Sample Max
size
Market
proxy
M No. of stocks
(diversif.%)
Sampling
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Copp and
Cleary (1999)
1985-1997 monthly CAN variance 222 and 236 200 full sample,
equally
weighted
5000 10 (68%), 20
(78%), 30
(84%), 50
(90%), 90
(99.6%)
uniform
Byrne and
Lee (2000)
UK real estate
Tang (2004) analytical - - variance 10 (90%), 20
(95%), 90 (99%)
uniform
Brands and
Gallagher
(2005)
1989-1999 monthly AUS SD, TWSD,
Sharpe, Skew,
Kurtosis
134 open-end
equity funds
30 full sample,
equally
weighted
10000 6 uniform
Domian et al.
(2007)
1985-2004 daily
(indi-
rectly)
US TW, safety first
criterion
1000 largest
common stock
series from NYSE,
NASDAQ, AMEX
with preference for
large cap
200 full sample,
equally
weighted
164 uniform,
industry
Goetzmann
and Kumar
(2008)
1991-1996 monthly NV, sum of
squared stocks
weights in a
portfolio, num. of
stocks
S&P500 and
full sample
equally
weighted
Dbouk and
Kryzanowski
(2009)
1985-1997 monthly US correlation of
bond returns,
excess standard
and mean derived
deviation, Sortino,
skew, kurtosis
bonds from
Lehman Brothers
Fixed Income
Database (total
27,497 bonds)
bond portfolios
of 25-40 bonds
Benjelloun
(2010)
1980-2000 monthly US TWSD, SD all listed on CRSP 100 estimated
asymptote
from regression
10000 40-50 uniform
and market
weights
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Study Period Freq. Market Measures Sample Max
size
Market
proxy
M No. of stocks
(diversif.%)
Sampling
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Kryzanowski
and Singh
(2010)
1975-2003 monthly CAN correlation,
cross-sectional and
time-series (semi)
variation, MDD,
MRD, NV
listed on TSX,
cross-listed on
TSX/US, small vs.
Big, IT firms
100 several
samples, all
equally
weighted
5000 20-25 (90%)
corr., 40-45
(90%) MDD, 95
(90%) for small
firms
uniform
This study 1973-2011 daily US, UK,
JAP,
CAN,
AUS
(i) SD, TWSD,
MAD, ES, LPM
(ii) Sharpe,
Sortino, Omega,
skew, kurtosis
(iii)R2
all listed and
delisted stocks on
NYSE, NASDAQ,
LSE, TSE, TSX,
ASX, 37
subperiods
1000 full sample,
equally
weighted
10000 uniform
Abbreviations: SD - time series standard deviation of portfolio returns, TWSD - portfolio terminal wealth standard deviation, MAD - mean absolute deviation, MDD -
mean derived dispersion, MRD - mean realized dispersion, NV - normalized variance
Countries: US - United States, UK - United Kingdom, FR - France, DE - Germany, CH - Switzerland, BE - Belgium, NL - Netherlands, IT - Italy, AUS - Australia, CAN
- Canada
Exchanges: NYSE - New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, LSE - London Stock Exchange, TSE - Tokyo Stock Exchange, TSX - Toronto Stock Exchange, ASX - Australian
Stock Exchange.
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Figure 13: United States. Panel (A) shows the average level of an n-stock portfolio standard deviation
normalized by the market standard deviation as defined by (??) above. For each year from 1975 to 2011
we construct an asymptote and show the average n-stock portfolio standard deviation for n = 1..20 relative
to the market standard deviation for each year (e.g. in 1995 the average security standard deviation was
almost five times higher than the market standard deviation). Similarly, Panel (B) shows the average level of
ES1% for an n-stock portfolio normalized by the market ES1% (e.g. in 1995 the average security ES1% was
four times higher than that of the market portfolio). In both panels, when n→ N , the normalized measure
approaches 1. In both cases, slower convergence requires a larger portfolio size to reduce diversifiable risk.
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Figure 14: United Kingdom. Panel (A) shows the average level of an n-stock portfolio standard deviation
normalized by the market standard deviation as defined by (??) above. For each year from 1975 to 2011
we construct an asymptote and show the average n-stock portfolio standard deviation for n = 1..20 relative
to the market standard deviation for each year (e.g. in 1985 the average security standard deviation was
almost five times higher than the market standard deviation). Similarly, Panel (B) shows the average level of
ES1% for an n-stock portfolio normalized by the market ES1% (e.g. in 1985 the average security ES1% was
five times higher than that of the market portfolio). In both panels, when n → N , the normalized measure
approaches 1. In both cases, slower convergence requires a larger portfolio size to reduce diversifiable risk.
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Figure 15: Japan. Panel (A) shows the average level of an n-stock portfolio standard deviation normalized
by the market standard deviation as defined by (??) above. For each year from 1975 to 2011 we construct
an asymptote and show the average n-stock portfolio standard deviation for n = 1..20 relative to the market
standard deviation for each year (e.g. in 1985 the average security standard deviation was more than five
times higher than the market standard deviation). Similarly, Panel (B) shows the average level of ES1% for
an n-stock portfolio normalized by the market ES1% (e.g. in 1983 the average security ES1% was five times
higher than that of the market portfolio). In both panels, when n→ N , the normalized measure approaches
1. In both cases, slower convergence requires a larger portfolio size to reduce diversifiable risk.
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Figure 16: Canada. Panel (A) shows the average level of an n-stock portfolio standard deviation normalized
by the market standard deviation as defined by (??) above. For each year from 1975 to 2011 we construct
an asymptote and show the average n-stock portfolio standard deviation for n = 1..20 relative to the market
standard deviation for each year (e.g. in 1996 the average security standard deviation was almost seven times
higher than the market standard deviation). Similarly, Panel (B) shows the average level of ES1% for an
n-stock portfolio normalized by the market ES1% (e.g. in 1996 the average security ES1% was seven times
higher than that of the market portfolio). In both panels, when n→ N , the normalized measure approaches
1. In both cases, slower convergence requires a larger portfolio size to reduce diversifiable risk.
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Figure 17: Australia. Panel (A) shows the average level of an n-stock portfolio standard deviation nor-
malized by the market standard deviation as defined by (??) above. For each year from 1975 to 2011 we
construct an asymptote and show the average n-stock portfolio standard deviation for n = 1..20 relative to
the market standard deviation for each year (e.g. in 1979 the average security standard deviation was six
times higher than the market standard deviation). Similarly, Panel (B) shows the average level of ES1% for
an n-stock portfolio normalized by the market ES1% (e.g. in 1979 the average security ES1% was nine times
higher than that of the market portfolio). In both panels, when n→ N , the normalized measure approaches
1. In both cases, slower convergence requires a larger portfolio size to reduce diversifiable risk.
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Figure 18: Portfolio size (color bar) by the level of diversification (vertical axis) across time
(horizontal axis). Based on our collected historical data we estimate the number of stocks an investor
should have held on average (higher number of stocks are represented in red, small number of stocks are in
blue) to achieve a desired level of diversification (x-axis) throughout the last 37 years. Left panels represent
our recommendations based on variance as a measure of risk. Right panels outline recommendations based
on 1% Expected Shortfall (ES) if taken as a measure of risk. For all the countries and across most years
the number of stocks required to reduce the level of the risk measure concerned is lower if the investor is
concerned with reduction of extreme losses. When η5(n) is equal to 0.05 or 0.1, for example, the level of
diversification is equivalent to 95% or 90% reduction in diversifiable risk respectively.
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